People often say that modern society has attempted to reduce sexuality to the couple—the heterosexual and, insofar as possible, legitimate couple. There are equal grounds for saying that it has, if not created, at least outfitted and made to proliferate, groups with multiple elements and a circulating sexuality: a distribution of points of power, hierarchized and placed opposite to one another; "pursued" pleasures, that is, both sought after and searched out; compartmental sexualities that are tolerated or encouraged; *proximities that serve as surveillance procedures*, and function as mechanisms of intensification; contacts that operate as inductors.—Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*, emphasis mine

The Empire Strikes Back . . . So you like skyscrapers, huh, bitch? —The legend on posters that appeared in midtown Manhattan only days after September 11, depicting a turbaned caricature of Osama bin Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State Building

the sexuality of terrorism

There has been a curious and persistent absence of dialogue regarding sexuality in public debates about counterterrorism, despite its crucial presence in American patriotism, warmongering, and empire building. Without these discourses of sexuality (and their attendant anxieties)—heterosexuality, homosexuality, queerness, metrosexuality, alternative and insurgent sexuality—the twin mechanisms of normalization and banishment that distinguish the terrorist from the patriot would cease to properly behave. At this historical juncture, the invocation of the terrorist as a queer, nonnational, perversely racialized other has become part of the normative script of the U.S. war on terror. One need only reflect upon the eager proliferation of homophobic-racist images (reactivated from the 1991 Gulf War, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century Orientalist histories) of terrorists since September 11, 2001. Take the

case of Osama bin Laden, who was portrayed as monstrous by association with sexual and bodily perversity (versions of both homosexuality and hypertrophied heterosexuality, or failed monogamy, that is, an Orientalist version of polygamy, as well as disability) through images in popular culture (also the case with Saddam/Sodom Hussein).[1] Recall, as an example, a website where weapons are provided to sodomize Osama bin Laden to death. Or even spy novelist John le Carré's pronouncement in *The Nation* that Osama bin Laden's manner in his video was akin to a "man of narcissistic homoeroticism," which can provide Americans with hope as "his barely containable male vanity, his appetite for self-drama and his closet passion for the limelight . . . will be his downfall, seducing him into a final dramatic act of self-destruction, produced, directed, scripted and acted to death by Osama bin Laden himself."[2]

Sexual deviancy is linked to the process of discerning, othering, and quarantining terrorist bodies, but these racially and sexually perverse figures also labor in the service of disciplining and normalizing subjects worthy of rehabilitation *away from* these bodies, in other words, signaling and enforcing the mandatory terms of patriotism. In this double deployment, the emasculated terrorist is not merely an other, but also a barometer of ab/normality involved in disciplinary apparatuses. Leti Volpp suggests, "September 11 facilitated the consolidation of a new identity category that groups together persons who appear 'Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim.' This consolidation reflects a racialization wherein members of this group are identified as terrorists, and are dis-identified as citizens."[3] This disidentification is a process of sexualization as well as of a racialization of religion. But the terrorist figure is not merely racialized and sexualized; the body must appear improperly racialized (outside the norms of multiculturalism) and perversely sexualized in order to materialize as the terrorist in the first place. Thus the terrorist and the person to be domesticated—the patriot— are not distant, oppositional entities, but "close cousins."[4]

Through this binary-reinforcing "you're either with us or against us" normativizing apparatus, the war on terror has rehabilitated some—clearly not all or most—lesbians, gays, and queers to U.S. national citizenship within a spatial-temporal domain I am invoking as "homonationalism," short for "homonormative nationalism." Homonormativity has been theorized by Lisa Duggan as a "new neo-liberal sexual politics" that hinges upon "the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption." Building on her critique of gay subjects embroiled in "a politics that does

not contest dominant heteronormative forms but upholds and sustains them,"[5] I am deploying the term homonationalism to mark arrangements of U.S. sexual exceptionalism explicitly in relation to the nation. Foucault notes that the legitimization of the modern couple is complicit with, rather than working against, the "outfitting" and proliferation of compartmental, circulating, and proximity-surveillance sexualities, pursued pleasures and contacts. We see simultaneously both the fortification of normative heterosexual coupling and the propagation of sexualities that mimic, parallel, contradict, or resist this normativity. These proliferating sexualities, and their explicit and implicit relationships to nationalism, complicate the dichotomous implications of casting the nation as only supportive and productive of heteronormativity and always repressive and disallowing of homosexuality. I argue that the Orientalist invocation of the terrorist is one discursive tactic that disaggregates U.S. national gays and queers from racial and sexual others, foregrounding a collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves: homonationalism. For contemporary forms of U.S. nationalism and patriotism, the production of gay and queer bodies is crucial to the deployment of nationalism, insofar as these perverse bodies reiterate heterosexuality as the norm but also because certain domesticated homosexual bodies provide ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects.

Mapping forms of U.S. homonationalism, vital accomplices to Orientalist terrorist others, instructively alludes to the "imaginative geographies" of the United States. Derek Gregory, reworking Edward Said's original framing, describes these geographies as fabrications, "combin[ing] 'something fictionalized' and 'something made real' because they are imaginations given substance."[6] What I take from this definition is that certain desired truths become lived as truths, as if they were truths, thus producing material traces and evidences of these truths, despite what counterevidence may exist. In other words, Gregory argues, imaginative geographies are performative: they produce the effect that they name and describe. Importantly, imaginative geographies endeavor to reconcile otherwise irreconcilable truths; they are mechanisms of, in Freudian terms, disavowal. It is through imaginative geographies produced by homonationalisms, for example, that the contradictions inherent in the idealization of the United States as a properly multicultural heteronormative but nevertheless gay-friendly, tolerant, and sexually liberated society can remain in tension. Despite the obvious unevenness of sexual and racial tolerance across varied U.S. spaces

and topographies of identity, it nonetheless exists as a core belief system about liberal mores defined *within* and *through* the boundaries of the United States.

I begin with a survey of the multiple activations of anxious multicultural heteronormativity that surfaced after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, noting the fissures and disruptions where gay and queer discourses intervene. I then explore multiple sites and genealogies of homonationalism, focusing less on conservative LGBTIQ discourses, which, though horrifically xenophobic, are hardly surprising and have been well-documented. Instead, I foreground three less apparent lineages of homonationalism: the analyses of terrorist corporealities by feminist, queer, and other scholars; the consumer habits of the gay and lesbian tourism industry, which consciously defines itself as a progressive industry that seeks social change through the disruption of "straight space"; and the liberal multicultural discourses of tolerance and diversity portrayed in the cable television cartoon *South Park*. These three sites, enmeshed in vastly differing homonationalisms, suggest both the radical contingency of any nationalist homosexual formation and the potency of their potential consolidation; thus, they may craft new critical cartographies as much as they may reify hegemonic dominant terrains.

Hetero- and Homonationalisms

We're told to go on living our lives as usual, because to do otherwise is to let the terrorists win, and really, what would upset the Taliban more than a gay woman wearing a suit in front of a room full of Jews?
—Ellen DeGeneres, hosting the 2001 Emmy Awards, twice postponed, on November 4, 2001; cited in Besen, "A True American Hero"

Heteronormativity is, as it always has been, indispensable to the promotion of an aggressive militarist, masculinist, race- and class-specific nationalism. In the United States, the aftermath of September 11 entailed the daily bombardment of reactivated and reverberating white (*and multicultural*, in cases where people of color and certain immigrant groups are properly patriotic, or serve symbolic or material needs, for example, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. military) heteronormative imagery, expectations, and hegemonies. From the images of grieving white widows of corporate executives to the concern about white firemen leaving their families to console widows of former coworkers to the consolidation of national families petitioning for bereavement funds to more recent images of broken military homes, the

preservation of white American heteronormative families has been at stake. But events such as the National Day of Mourning (where multicultural families gathered together to grieve national loss), the work of numerous national advocacy groups for Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Americans who presented their communities as established by upright, *proper* citizens, and the ubiquitous appearance of American flags in immigrant communities, indicate the extent to which normative multiculturalism helped actively produce this renewed nationalism. The narration of sexual practices after the attacks iterated September 11 as a trauma of national sexual violation, proffering predictions as well as advice about "terror sex." Worried that the "nation's sexual health could spiral," Judy Kuriansky and other sex therapists discouraged "maladaptive" behavior, that is, sex outside of primary, intimate relationships, insinuating that nonmonogamous and other nonnormative sexual scenarios were not helping or were disrupting the nation's healing process.[7] Conservative Christian right-wingers such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson predictably blamed abortionists, feminists, and gays and lesbians for the attacks, while George W. Bush used them as yet another alibi for his pro-family agenda through federal programs to fund research and education on "healthy marriages."[8] Same-sex surviving partners petitioning for bereavement funds were initially subjected to plans to have the families of deceased partners account for and validate their relationship, infuriating many LGBTIQ advocates.[9] Additionally, gay and bisexual men continued to be broadly excluded from donating blood.[10]

However, even as patriotism immediately after September 11 was inextricably tied to a reinvigoration of heterosexual norms for Americans, progressive sexuality was championed as a hallmark of U.S. modernity. For despite this reentrenchment of heteronormativity, the United States was also portrayed as "feminist" in relation to the Taliban's treatment of Afghani women (a concern that had been previously of no interest to U.S. foreign policy) and gay-safe in comparison to the Middle East.[11] While Americans lauded "gay heroes" such as Mark Bingham, who attempted to divert one of the hijacked planes, and Father Mychal Judge, a gay New York Fire Department chaplain who perished in 1 World Trade Center, the *New York Times* published obituaries of gay and lesbian victims focusing on their bereaved partners and commemorating their long-term relationships.[12] For a brief moment there was talk of a retraction or suspension of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in the face of the need for greater recruitment.[13] (The exercising of this policy has resulted in the dismissal of at least twenty-two gay or lesbian military linguists specializing in Arabic, Korean,

FIGURE 4. *Embody* (from Gay.com's "Come Together" advertising campaign). ©2006. PlanetOut Inc. All rights reserved. Produced by PlanetOut Creative Services Group; Christy Shaefer, Creative Director.

and Farsi. The Pentagon's latest statistics show that the number of dis-
charges since September 11, 2001, have declined by half and are at their
lowest level from the time the figures were first tallied in 1997.)[14]

Paralleling an uneasy yet urgent folding in of homosexuality into the "us"
of the "us-versus-them" nationalist rhetoric, LGBTIQ constituencies took up
the patriotic call in various modalities.[15] Gay conservatives such as Andrew
Sullivan came out in favor of bombing Afghanistan and advocated "gender
patriotism": butching up and femme-ing down to perform the virility of the
American nation,[16] a political posture implying that emasculation is un-
seemly and unpatriotic. The American flag appeared everywhere in gay
spaces, in gay bars and gay gyms, and gay pride parades became loaded with
national performatives and symbolism: the pledge of allegiance, the singing
of the national anthem, and floats dedicated to national unity.[17] (As with the
case of communities of color, these flags and other patriotic symbolism may
function as both defensive and normalizing gestures.) Many gays and
queers identified with the national populous as "victims of terrorism" by
naming gay and queer bashing a form of terrorism;[18] some claimed it was
imperative to support the war on terror in order to "liberate" homosexuals
in the Middle East. Mubarak Dahir angrily challenges this justification of
the war and calls on gays and lesbians who support the war in Iraq to "stop
using the guise of caring about the plight of gay Arabs to rationalize their
support."[19] National LGBTIQ organizations such as the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and the Human Rights Campaign had little
political reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan (and subsequently have
been more preoccupied with gay marriage campaigns and gays in the mili-
tary than the occupation of Iraq).[20] One exception was the protest of homo-
phobic graffiti on an army missile, "High Jack This Fags," by the Gay and
Lesbian Alliance against Defamation (GLAAD). Their press release quotes
Executive Director Joan M. Garry: "If U.S. military property had been
defaced with a racial, ethnic or religious slur against any other group—
including against the targeted terrorists—I doubt the Associated Press
would have found such a photo acceptable for publication."[21] Interesting in
this passage is that the epithet "fags" is de-linked from any racist connota-
tions, comprehended only as a homophobic slur; the "targeted terrorists"
are naturalized as the appropriate mark for this missile, thus implying
support for the invasion of Afghanistan. Presumably, the word "fags" refers
to the Afghanis, a racist epithet that GLAAD did not question.

Opposition to the war from various queer quarters also took bizarre
forms. The decrease of funding for HIV/AIDS research was proffered as one

rationale not to go to war.[22] An even more egregious example is the equating of victims of homophobia with victims of the Iraq invasion; note, for example, the statement released by the Metropolitan Community Church:

> We call upon all people of faith and people of goodwill everywhere, especially our sisters and brothers in the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities who know first hand what it means to be vilified, labeled and violently attacked, and who also know how difficult it is to survive under such circumstances, to join with the friends and members of Metropolitan Community Churches to oppose any further acts of aggression against Iraq.[23]

Positive exceptions to these homonationalist discussions came from Al-Fatiha, the international Muslim LGBTIQ association, and the Audre Lorde Project, an LGBTQ of color community-based organization in Brooklyn; both issued statements condemning the attacks and hate crimes and opposing retaliatory measures against Afghanistan.[24] The Audre Lorde Project created a nationwide coalition of antiwar LGBTIQ groups, as did Queers for Peace and Justice.[25] Many queer of color groups, mostly located in major urban locales, reported that immediately after the events of September 11, 2001, their lines of solidarity fell toward their respective nonqueer mainstream racial and immigrant advocacy groups rather than with mainstream queer organizations.[26] Additionally, Surina Khan (a Pakistani Muslim), then the director of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, stated that IGLHRC took a "clear position against the bombing of Afghanistan." Citing the Cairo-52 (raids against homosexuals in Cairo in May 2001) as casualties of the war on terrorism, Khan noted that the United States had already begun to relax pressure on other countries committing human rights abuses. She and IGLHRC have received heavy criticism for their antiwar statement.[27]

Unwittingly enacting this split between queers of color and white and mainstream queers, the *Village Voice* executive editor and journalist Richard Goldstein claimed that there had been a transference of national stigma from one group, queers, to another, Arabs. In relegating the queer and the Arab to mutually exclusive realms, Goldstein articulates a primary facet of homonationalism: that of the whiteness of gay, homosexual, and queer bodies, and the attendant presumed heterosexuality of colored bodies. While this cleaving of race and sexuality resonates historically, the legal theorist Muneer Ahmad explains why such transference of stigma appears acceptable:

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FIGURE 5. American flag at Chicago's gay pride parade, 2005.
Photograph by Sara Antunovich. Reprinted with the artist's permission.

The killings of people like James Byrd and Matthew Shepard were deemed in-
comprehensible. In contrast, the killing of Balbir Singh Sodhi, Waqar Hasan, and
others, while deplored as wrong, have been understood as the result of displaced
anger, that underlying anger being one with which the vast majority of Ameri-
cans sympathize and agree. The perpetrators of these crimes, then, were guilty
not of malicious intent, but of expressing a socially appropriate emotion in
socially inappropriate ways. To borrow from criminal law, the hate killings be-
fore September 11 were viewed as crimes of moral depravity, while the hate
killings since September 11 have been understood as crimes of passion.[28]

Hate crimes against gays and lesbians are still rationalized through these
very same terms: is not the expression of "a socially appropriate emotion in
socially inappropriate ways" the crux of the "gay panic" defense? Historical
amnesia prevails. In the sway from crimes of moral depravity to crimes of
passion, Ahmad argues, it is not only that the targets of attack have altered,

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but that the entire mechanism of scapegoating is now rife with sentiment that is attached to the gendered, sexualized, and racial codings of these bodies. It is notable that white, middle- to upper-class, kind-and-gentle college student Matthew Shepard became the quintessential poster boy for the U.S.-based LGBTIQ antiviolence movement, one that has spawned a stage production (*The Laramie Project*) among other consumables.[29] Indeed, exemplary of this transference of stigma, positive attributes were attached to Mark Bingham's homosexuality: butch, masculine, rugby player, white, American, hero, gay patriot, called his mom (i.e., homonational), while negative connotations of homosexuality were used to racialize and sexualize Osama bin Laden: feminized, stateless, dark, perverse, pedophilic, disowned by family (i.e., fag).[30] What is at stake here is not only that one is good and the other evil; the homosexuality of Bingham is converted into acceptable patriot values, while the evilness of bin Laden is more fully and efficaciously rendered through associations with sexual excess, failed masculinity (i.e., femininity), and faggotry.

While I have briefly highlighted the most egregious examples of the collusions between homosexuality and U.S. nationalism—gay conservatives such as Andrew Sullivan being the easiest and prime target—I am actually more compelled by progressive and liberal discourses of LGBTIQ identity and how they might unwittingly use, rely upon, or reinscribe U.S. nationalisms, U.S. sexual exceptionalisms, and homonormative imaginative geographies. The proliferation of queer caricatures in the media and popular culture (such as *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy* and, more recently, *Queer Eye for the Straight Girl*), the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling upholding same-sex marriage (2004), and the overturning of sodomy regulations through the *Lawrence and Garner v. Texas* ruling (2003) all function as directives regarding suitable and acceptable kinship, affiliative, and consumption patterns, consolidating a deracialized queer liberal constituency that makes it less easy to draw delineations between assimilated gay or lesbian identities and ever-so-vigilant and -resistant queer identities. Even the acronym LGBTIQ suggests the collapsing into or the analogizing of multiple identity strands. In homonormative narratives of nation, there is a dual movement: U.S. patriotism momentarily sanctions some homosexualities, often through gendered, racial, and class sanitizing, in order to produce "monster-terrorist-fags"; homosexuals embrace the us-versus-them rhetoric of U.S. patriotism and thus align themselves with this racist and homophobic production.[31] Aspects of homosexuality have come within the purview of normative patriotism, incorporating aspects of queer subjectivity into the body of the normalized nation; on

the other hand, terrorists are quarantined through equating them with the bodies and practices of failed heterosexuality, emasculation, and queered others. This dual process of incorporation and quarantining involves the articulation of race with nation. Nation, and its associations with modernity and racial and class hierarchies, becomes the defining factor in disaggregating between upright, domesticatable queernesses that mimic and recenter liberal subjecthood, and out-of-control, untetherable queernesses.

Queer theory has contributed to the analysis of the heteronormative constructions of nation as well as of citizenship. M. Jacqui Alexander claims that the "nation disallows queerness"; V. Spike Peterson locates "nationalism as heterosexism"; Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner have elaborated upon "national heterosexuality."[32] But heteronormative penetration paradigms continue to inform feminist and progressive theorizing of globalization conquest and war—the land is female and virgin territory, the invader masculine—epitomized by heterosexual rape as the ultimate violation of the nation through its emasculating force, a normative colonial genealogy. As Frantz Fanon's work symptomatizes so well, the concern about heterosexual rape functions doubly: it attends, importantly, to violence against women, but it also forcefully masks triangulated desire, whereby the fear—and fantasy—of the penetrated male is displaced onto the safer figure of the raped female. Thus rape itself, as a weapon of war or as a metaphor for economic exploitation, is emptied of its might without this suturing of heteronormative ideologies and homoerotically charged audiences. In the persuasive rethinking of the discursive and hermeneutic qualities of capitalism by J. K. Gibson-Graham (pseudonym for Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson), rape as a metaphor of the penetration of globalization is differently articulated. This is a noteworthy poststructuralist feminist intervention seeking to denaturalize Marxist economic theories. By asking how globalization might "lose its erection," Gibson-Graham seek to overturn the "phallocentric heterosexism (in which the act of penetration, whether called rape or intercourse, defines sexual difference)" of this story of capitalism: "The globalization script normalizes an act of non-reciprocal penetration. Capitalist social and economic relations are scripted as penetrating 'other' social and economic relations but not vice versa. (The penis can penetrate or invade a woman's body, but a woman cannot imprint, invade, or penetrate a man.)"[33]

Following Sharon Marcus's work on the rape script, Gibson-Graham suggest a two-pronged deconstructive approach: diminish the power of the perpetrator by refusing the victim role and challenge discourses of sexuality within which such scripts garner their potency. While Gibson-Graham dis-

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mantle to some extent the coherency of male bodies "as hard, thrusting and powerful," as well as scramble the market-commodity-capital trajectory of capitalism, they are less successful in their attempt to destabilize the sex-gender-sexuality triad that secures heteronormativity. A reversal of positions is conceded and masculine-masculine penetration acknowledged, but feminine-feminine penetration (fists, fingers, dildos, to name but a few projectiles) appears unfathomable. Furthermore, a lack of engagement with postcolonial theory leaves racial dynamics unexplored (for, as Fanon reveals, the subordinate position of the feminine is always perversely racialized). In short, the act of penetration itself is categorically naturalized, not only as part of a heterosexuality that, through the intent to destabilize it, is cast as the same everywhere regardless of geopolitical locale. Left undeconstructed, the penetration narrative reproduces racial subordination as inevitable within a natural ordering, precisely the qualifications of the rape script that Gibson-Graham seek to dislodge. They mess around with gender, but at the expense of race, which must remain transparent and stable, a hallmark of much feminist Marxist scholarship. Thus the script is mainly inverted, not subverted. The reliance on binaried positionalities lingers;[34] even analyses that do center sexuality tend to be restricted by their articulation of whiteness as a queer norm.

In a similar vein, Shane Phelan's book *Sexual Strangers* argues that "lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered people in the United States are strangers," defined as "neither us nor clearly them, not friend and not enemy, but a figure of ambivalence who troubles the border between us and them. The enemy is the clear opposite of the citizen, but the stranger is more fraught with anxiety."[35] Yet it is certainly the case that within a national as well as a transnational frame, some queers are better than others. While this body of work collectively underscores heteronormativity as a prerequisite for both legal and cultural citizenship, some of it also fails to theorize the class-, race-, and gender-specific dimensions of this heteronormativity; heteronormativity is held as temporally and spatially stable, uninflected, and transparent. An uninterrogated positioning of white racial privilege and a single, rather than intersectional, axis of identity is assumed. There are indeed multiple figures of ambivalence, many strangers who trouble and destabilize the nation's boundaries, suggesting a more complex imaginative geography of the United States than is envisioned with the notion of lesbians and gays as the quintessential strangers of the nation.

While queering the nation has impelled politically salient dialogue regarding reproduction of racial and national lineages and norms, nationaliz-

ing queerness has primarily served to reiterate discourses of American sexual exceptionalism. As nationhood and queerness are both indebted to modernity, and modern sexual identities are built on the histories of colonialism, nation formation and empire, and racialization, the nation is founded on the (homo)sexual other. As mentioned earlier, Fanon's corpus of work is luminously suggestive of the homosexual fantasies and fears that found nationalism, whereby his anxieties about interracial heterosexual relations filter out homoerotic charges and antagonisms between colonized and colonizing men (and by inference, colonized and colonizing women).[36] The figures of the raped colonized woman and the lynched black colonized man and even the conquered (by the black man) white woman work to deflect the gaze away from other, less tolerable figures and subsequent lines of affinity, such as the penetrated (raped?) male and the woman-desiring female. Thus one could argue that homosexual desires, and their redirection, are foundational to the project of nationalism, as is the strict policing of the homo-hetero binary, and nations are heteronormative because of, rather than despite, homosexuality.

Thus, my interest in theorizing U.S. national homosexuality, or homonationalism, is to map out the intersections, confluences, and divergences between homosexuality and the nation, national identity, and nationalism —the convivial, rather than antagonistic, relations between presumably nonnormative sexualities and the nation. If we follow V. Spike Peterson's theorization of nationalism as heterosexism, in which she situates the nation not only as familial, but also as fraternal, we see that the fraternal nation-state is organized to promote political homosocial relations among men in order to discourage and prohibit homosexual relations between men. While homosexuality is considered incompatible with serving in the military, it nevertheless is a prime example of "how heterosexist premises underpin hegemonic masculinity. As a site of celebrated homosocial bonding the military affords men a unique opportunity to experience intimacy and interdependence with men."[37] Debatable is her assertion of the sheer uniqueness of this opportunity, given the preponderance of fraternities, sports teams and events, male-only clubs, firehouses, the upper echelons of corporate spaces, and so on. This is an outdated description of the U.S. military given the large proportion of men of color and of female recruits, especially women of color, building the American face of the diverse, progressive national normativity. Nonetheless, Peterson's trenchant point remains. If we are to take seriously the proposition that the nation is at once familial *and* fraternal, homosocial fraternal relations exist both to reiterate

the centrality of the heteronormative family and to act as a stopgap preventative measure—a consolation for the prohibition of homosexual relations. To invert this trajectory, familial structures of the nation work both to consolidate heterosexuality as indispensable to national belonging and homosexuality as inimical to it. Heterosexuality works to secure the uninterrogated, unremarked upon access to homosocial spaces; through its prohibition of homosexuality, heterosexuality sanctions homosociality while naming and producing the disallowed homosexuality. Thus the (western) homosexual-heterosexual binary is a primary rather than secondary facet of the project of nationalism. Furthermore, theorizations of nationalism and sexuality need to attend to the multiplicity of the others of heteronormativity and, in turn, the multiple figures of the others of homonationalism. As Alexander has demonstrated, "Heterosexuality is at once necessary to the state's ability to constitute and imagine itself, while simultaneously marking a site of its own instability."[38] If, according to binaried sex-gender-desire logic, homosexuality is that which shadows the instability of the nation's heterosexuality, then that shadow itself is not constituted outside of nationhood, but rather within it, around it, hovering over it. Through the prescription of heteronormative stability, or security, the matter of the insecure becomes highlighted: the shadow that is within and outside, the internally disciplined and the externally quarantined and banished.

Returning to Foucault's sketch of flourishing sexualities as a "circulating sexuality: a distribution of points of power, hierarchized and placed opposite to one another," the shadow is imagined, felt, feared, desired, and in some instances, envisioned, to effectively function as a threat.[39] Queer bodies may be disallowed, yet there is room for the absorption and management of homosexuality—temporally, historically, and spatially specific— when advantageous for the nation. As homonormativity is one of a range of "compartmental sexualities that are tolerated or encouraged," this management is not consistent and is often directed only toward certain audiences. As a "proximity that serves as surveillance procedures," homonormativity is both disciplined by the nation and its heteronormative underpinnings and also effectively surveils and disciplines those sexually perverse bodies that fall outside its purview. Thus the nation not only allows for queer bodies, but also actually disciplines and normalizes them; in other words, the nation is not only heteronormative, but also homonormative. Reading nonnormative gay, homosexual, and queer bodies *through* the nation, not against it, is to acknowledge that (some) nations are productive of nonnormative sexualities, not merely repressive of them. There are at least three

deployments of homonationalism that bolster the nation. First, it reiterates heterosexuality as the norm; for example, the bid for gay marriage accords an "equal but different" status (equal to the heterosexual norm of marriage for gay and queer monogamous relationships). Second, it fosters nationalist homosexual positionalities indebted to liberalism (through normative kinship forms as well as through consumption spheres that set up state/market dichotomies), which then police (through panopticon and profile) nonnationalist nonnormative sexualities. Third, it enables a transnational discourse of U.S. sexual exceptionalism vis-à-vis perversely racialized bodies of pathologized nationalities (both inside and outside U.S. borders), as the violence in Abu Ghraib (chapter 2) horrifically lays bare.

Genealogies of Terrorism

As our enemies exploit the benefits of our global environment to operate around the world, our approach must be global as well. When they run, we will follow. When they hide, we will find them. Some battlefields will be known, others unknown. The campaign ahead will be long and arduous. In this different kind of war, we cannot expect an easy or definitive end to the conflict.—White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*

One of the subtler trajectories of homonationalism emerges in critical scholarly commentary on the causal links between terrorism and subjectivity. These efforts, launched in part to redress the absence of gender and sexuality in analyses of terrorism and to disrupt dominant narratives about pathology and trauma, nonetheless reproduce some of the very assumptions they seek to dismantle. Government renditions of the causes of terrorism and the field of terrorism studies are highly dependent on such assumptions. For example, the *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* lays out the U.S. blueprint for a global surveillance network headed by an international police and interrogation force trained and led by the United States. A list of terrorist attacks on the United States excludes the Oklahoma City bombing, relegating terrorism to the unknowable and inchoate nonwhite outside and evading the knowledge of an internal threat.[40] In this document the stated goal of U.S. policy is to "Return Terrorism to the 'Criminal Domain'" through a disciplining—"squeeze, tighten, and isolate" is the phrase used—of diffuse and global terrorist cells in order to "localize the threat," that is, to quarantine that which is ostensibly beyond the criminal domain (the perversion and pathology of the stateless, uncivilized, unrecognizable) into

the realm of the domestic space of the feminized, state-contained, ineffectual. The lexicon of contagion and disease suture the etymological and political links of terrorist infiltration and invasion to queerness and the AIDS virus. The two models of terrorism used by the State Department vacillate between pyramid structure and network structure. The former (also present as a terrorist structure, along with the "tapeworm metaphor," in the *Battle of Algiers*, viewed by the Pentagon in August 2003) represents a known rational administrative format: phallic, and hence castratable. The latter can be read as the monstrosity of perverse projectiles and chaotic presences.[41] The yearning to castrate that which eludes castration is a potent prophylactic and, as such, hardly tangential. As a productive narrative, it provides the justification for heightened surveillance, border control, and interrogation mandates and sets the stage for the scapegoating and attack of sexualized and racialized terrorist look-alikes.

The anxiety of managing rhizomic, cell-driven, nonnational, transnational terrorist networks that have no self-evident beginning or finite end point is often sublimated (against the foil of the western liberal rational subject) through the story of individual responsibility and individuated pathology. In her attention to discursivity, Judith Butler notes that these speculations about the terrorists' "personal pathology" are one of only a few narrative options if one is to start the story prior to September 11, 2001. Such stories are necessary because they displace other pre-9/11 stories of U.S. foreign policy and global capital (for example, in relation to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan). As Butler points out, "It works as a plausible and engaging narrative in part because it resituates agency in terms of a subject, something we can understand, something that accords with our idea of personal responsibility, or with the theory of charismatic leadership that was popularized with Mussolini and Hitler in World War II."[42] The fully individuated psyche, one centered in conventional psychoanalytic theory and praxis, is without a context, history, or politics.

The counterpart to this obsessive pathologizing of the individual is the deep narcissism implied in the query "Why do they hate us?" (the intonation of which usually implies something different: How *could* they hate us?). Edward Said, tracing the shift from cold war to terrorist anxieties, turns the psychoanalytic metanarrative gaze back upon the terrorized:

> Past and future bombing raids aside, the terrorism craze is dangerous because it consolidates the immense, unrestrained pseudopatriotic narcissism we are nourishing. Is there no limit to the folly that convinces large numbers of Americans

that it is now unsafe to travel, and at the same time blinds them to all the pain and violence that so many people in Africa, Asia, and Latin America must endure simply because we have decided that local oppressors, whom we call freedom fighters, can go on with their killing in the name of anticommunism and antiterrorism?[43]

Situating terrorism as a pseudo-patriotic narcissistic discourse provides an opportunity to examine what is at stake for the terrorist in this inversion. It is exactly this reversal that is enacted in the narrative of the United States as the victim of terrorism. Commenting on this deployment of "the culture industry of 'trauma' [which] leads to a mystification of history, politics, and cultural critique," the authors of a statement titled "Transnational Feminist Practices against War" write, "Signs of the current trauma discourse's ethnocentricity come through in media depictions staged within the therapeutic framework that tend to afford great meaning, significance, and sympathy to those who lost friends and family members in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. By contrast, people who have lost loved ones as a consequence of US foreign policy elsewhere are not depicted as sufferers of trauma or injustice."[44] However, it is not only that psychic distress is allowed to exist for those in the United States but not for others, but that the one narrative of trauma that does appear to apply to the terrorist—the deranged product of the failed (western) romance of the heteronormative nuclear family—stands nearly alone as the pathological force behind terrorism.

Such recitations of individual pathology plague the field of terrorism studies as well, and its accomplice, counterterrorism studies; both academic endeavors are fueled by private security trade corporations and "neoconservative Israeli or Washington think-tanks."[45] In September 1999, the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress prepared a comprehensive manuscript, "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?," to survey the literature on terrorism studies. In this policy document, causality is divided into five purportedly distinct approaches: political (driven by university environments, a "major recruiting ground for terrorists," where "Marxist-Leninist ideology or other revolutionary ideas" are learned); organizational (group versus individual leader dynamics); physiological (the media acts as a contagion factor in the stimulation of potential terrorists who "become aroused in a violence-accepting way by media presentations of terrorism"); psychological (the subdivisions of which include the frustration-aggression hypothesis, the negative identity hypothesis—"a vindictive rejection of the role regarded as desirable and

proper by an individual's family and community," and the narcissistic rage hypothesis, mental illness induced by psychological damage during childhood); and finally, multicausal (a combination of the above).[46] The "terrorist mindset" is thus qualified by two standard theories: the terrorist as mentally ill, or the terrorist as fanatic—a "rational, logical, planning individual" ("this approach takes into account that terrorists are often well-educated and capable of sophisticated, albeit highly biased, rhetoric and political analysis").[47] Terrorist psychologists have developed certain models, which are described in the report: Eric Shaw's personal pathway model declares, "The underlying need to belong to a terrorist group is symptomatic of an incomplete or fragmented psychosocial identity" (25); Jerrold Post has developed the notion of "terrorist psycho-logic," which evacuates intentional choice from a terrorist's actions, stating that psychological forces drive the terrorist to violence (28). Overall, however, the report concedes, "There is considerable evidence . . . that international terrorists are generally quite sane," and "the careful, detailed planning and well-timed execution that have characterized many terrorist operations are hardly typical of mentally disturbed individuals" (30). Citing "Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups" by C. R. McCauley and M. E. Segal, who assert, "Terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology," the report concludes, "Terrorists are recruited from a population that describes most of us" (30–31). Terrorism expert Martha Crenshaw concurs, alleging, "The outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality" (thus the concept of normality is not reassessed nor altered).[48] In making that statement, Crenshaw is also pointing to the details of the sociological terrorist composite or profile, which Robin Morgan also enumerates: 80 percent are male, average age between 22 and 25, unmarried, and more than two-thirds are from the middle to upper classes and have university training, if not an advanced degree.[49]

Despite the Federal Research Division's cautious evaluation of the most conservative elements of terrorism studies, the realm of the anti-U.S., antiwestern imperialist political is nonetheless cast as misguided, irrational, and archaic, a mainstay of modernity's failures. Throughout the report, while political motivations for terrorist acts are alluded to, the urgency and import of the political critique is discounted or deemed inconsequential. The report regularly employs metonymic strings to uncivilized barbarism; terms and phrases such as *subjective interpretation*, *narrow lens*, *cultural*, *extreme end of a continuum*, *delusional and biased*, *moral imperatives*, and "distorting lens of their religious beliefs" (43), as well as statements like "their worldviews differ in critical ways from western worldviews" (43), are littered through-

out. Although Osama bin Laden is hailed as "the prototype of a new breed of terrorist—the private entrepreneur who puts modern enterprise at the service of a global terrorist network" (6), religion—not politics, not economics—is figured as the reason behind terrorist activity. Religion is understood in these documents through the lens of liberal secularism as the antithesis to modernity and rationality. In a section entitled "New Types of Cold War Terrorists," the report argues for recognition of a shift in terrorist action:

> When the conventional terrorist groups and individuals of the early 1970's are compared with terrorists of the early 1990's, a trend can be seen: the emergence of religious fundamentalist and new religious groups espousing the rhetoric of mass-destruction terrorism. . . . These groups have a *different attitude towards violence*—one that is *extranormative* and seeks to maximize violence against the perceived enemy. . . . Their outlook is one that divides the world simplistically into "them" and "us." (6) (emphasis mine)

Religious belief is thus cast, in relation to other factors fueling terrorism, as the overflow, the final excess that impels monstrosity—the "different attitude towards violence" signaling these uncivilizable forces. Difference itself is pathological. In the liberal-secular imaginary, religion is also *always already* pathological. Later, the document highlights that the most dangerous terrorist is the Islamic fundamentalist, quoting Jerrold M. Post, who claims that "the most dangerous terrorist is likely to be the religious terrorist": "Unlike the average political or social terrorist, who has a defined mission that is somewhat measurable in terms of media attention or government reaction, the religious terrorist can justify the most heinous acts 'in the name of Allah,' for example."[50] Apparently, a critique of western neo-imperialist economic domination or U.S. foreign policy or Christian and Jewish fundamentalisms and hegemonies does not constitute a legitimate raison d'être for political or social terrorism, nor does the establishment and observation of religion itself qualify as a mode of political or social criticism, dissent, or resistance. Ironically, the secular model that purports to protect politics from religion functions in this case to efface this very realm. Furthermore, the entrenchment of Islamophobia in terrorism studies is structural as well as ideological; as Kevin Toolis observes, "Israel . . . remains the model of the counter-terrorist state. Almost all western counter-terrorist academic centers are closely linked to Israeli institutions such as the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism."[51] Note that this assessment of Islam is easily rendered through the blatant omission in this report of "right-wing terrorists": "A fifth typology [the others are nationalist-separatist, religious

fundamentalist, new religious, and social revolutionary], for right-wing terrorists, is not listed because right-wing terrorists were not specifically designated as being a subject of this study. In any case, there does not appear to be any significant right-wing group on the U.S. Department of State's list of foreign terrorist organizations" (15). That is to say, the only terrorists not examined in this document are white supremacists and Christian fundamentalists such as Timothy McVeigh and Matt Hale and their organizations; in absentia they are sanctioned and rendered on par with other uncommented upon variables such as the state terrorisms of Israel and the United States. Toolis notes, "Counter-terrorism remains a study by the state, in the form of selected academics and a few police and military figures, of the enemies of the states. The objects of study—'terrorists' or their political representatives . . . are never invited to contribute."[52]

These proclivities do not lie within terrorism studies alone. Remarking on the "interesting overlap between pronouncements by career militarists and reductive analyses by pseudo-scientists," Robin Morgan argues, "The 'terrorist psychology' concept is a convenient way of evading complexities, including political ones. Some of its advocates have solemnly announced that terrorists are created by 'inadequate or absent mothering' that has resulted in depression, hypochondria, dysphoria, and destructiveness. When in doubt, blame mothers." Critical of terrorism studies experts like Jerrold Post, who favor the western heteronormative nuclear family structure as they zero in on psychic childhood dysfunction, Morgan's attempts at theorizing the relationships between patriarchy and violence, though perhaps feminist in intent, also have reductive tendencies. Her analysis of patriarchy as the backbone of terrorism, in typical radical feminist fashion, suggests that terrorism functions as sex, what she terms "ejaculatory politics."[53] Unsurprisingly, she borders on advocating lesbianism and a women-centered world as the antidote to terrorism.

Claiming that "it is in the crucible of all-male intensity that the bonds of terrorist commitment and self-denial are formed," anthropologist Lionel Tiger offers up the conventional and overstated male-bonding thesis:

> The terrorism of Bin Laden harnesses the chaos of young men, uniting the energies of political ardor and sex in a turbulent fuel. The structure of al-Qaida— an all-male enterprise, of course—appears to involve small groups of relatively young men who maintain strong bonds with each other, bonds whose intensity is dramatized and heightened by the secrecy demanded by their missions and the danger of their projects.[54]

Tiger foregrounds the prominence of gender-segregated spaces and polygamy in Muslim communities, arguing that these are the fodder for the same-sex intimacy necessary for the intensity of terrorist bonding. Later, however, he avers that bin Laden's troops "have no choice but to accustom themselves to relatively monastic lives," at once overlooking the possibility of same-sex liaisons while also rendering any homosociality, indeed homosexuality, as mere defaults due to the apparent impossibility of approximating fulfilling heterosexual relations. According to Joseph Massad, this is a common Orientalist discourse propagated by what he dubs the "Gay International": gay and lesbian liberationist and missionary NGOs, supplemented by purportedly queer anthropological and ethnographic accounts of Arab male same-sex sexuality.[55] Perhaps the most damning aspect of Tiger's psychological analysis is its foreclosure of any kind of political, economic, or material critique immanent to terrorist motivations. A final quote: "The danger of belonging to [bin Laden's troops] enhances their excitement and feeds their sense of worthwhile enterprise. Their comrades provide them an emotional haven and a clear focus for the turbulent energies at the intersection of youth and despair. Their basic weapons are intensity and extreme commitment, not the usual visible armament of warriors."[56] Tiger's focus on the erotic rush colludes with an insinuation floating about in conservative discourses that the legalization of homosexuality in Arab countries would delimit the recruitment of isolated young men into terrorist organizations. The emotive affect of Tiger's piece, presumably intended to stress the psychic and mental desperation of the young men he writes about, serves only to further mock the possibility of politically motivated (rather than emotional, sexual, theological, irrational, or moral—all excessive and feminized attributes within Tiger's explanatory devices) dissent.[57]

Zillah Eisenstein reminds us that while narratives of the Taliban's problematic womenless world abounded, no such failure was ascribed to the "very manly moment" of the post-9/11 white world of rugged firefighters, policemen, ground zero workers, and corporate suits. The point is well taken, but Eisenstein goes on to quote Ahmed Rashid writing on the Taliban, who says that "most of these men grew up in refugee camps without the love or camaraderie of mothers or sisters."[58] Here we see the overreliance on a type of heteronormative psychoanalytic explanatory framework of patriarchy that evacuates politics, global capital, even poverty from the range of potential origin narratives. In an inverse move, Ros Petchesky also claims that the normality of patriarchy is what terrorist networks and

the global capitalism of the United States have in common.[59] One claims abnormality, the other normality; both of these ahistorical and aspatial explanations portend amnesia of the presence of same-sex, gender-segregated realms and cogendered arenas of domestic and public life in the many varied Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Arab contexts.

The sociologist Michael Kimmel also argues that normative gender regimes contribute to the humiliation of damaged psyches: "What is relevant is not the possible fact of . . . [Mohamed] Atta's gayness, but the shame and fear that surround homosexuality in societies that refuse to acknowledge sexual diversity"—ironic, given that (indeed) the United States is such a society.[60] Claiming that, for the Taliban, terrorism offers the "restoration of their masculinity," Kimmel focuses on class: "Central to their political ideology is the recovery of manhood from the emasculating politics of globalization and the westernization of Afghanistan as humiliations." While Kimmel's emphasis on processes of gendering rather than sexual object choice is laudable, he conjures globalization as an overwhelming and overarching force that depletes all resistance, with the distinguished exception of retribution: "The terrors of emasculation experienced by lower-middle-class men all over the world will no doubt continue, as they struggle to make a place for themselves in shrinking economies and inevitably shifting cultures. They may continue to feel a seething resentment against women, whom they perceive as stealing their rightful place at the head of the table, and against the governments that displace them."[61]

Comparing the Taliban to white supremacists in the United States and Mohammed Atta to Timothy McVeigh, Kimmel universalizes the plight of emasculated manhood through essentializing a global heteromasculine identity and presuming the global hegemony of a normative sex-gender-desire triad, not to mention a crude Marxist version of class affinity. Once again, there is a misreading of gender in Afghanistan as strictly heteronormative, as distinct from a mixture of homosocial and heterosocial milieus. Massad argues, "Efforts to impose a European heterosexual regime on Arab men have succeeded only among the upper classes and the increasingly Westernized middle-classes."[62] The question that must be posed before such comparisons can be proffered is this: What constitutes normative gender regimes in Arab contexts? (This, of course, does not even begin to attend to Atta's time in Germany, nor his upbringing in Cairo.) Furthermore, naming fiasco after fiasco of Hitler's, Atta's, and McVeigh's—"all three failed at their chosen profession"—Kimmel's analysis insinuates that the inability of entitled men to assimilate themselves into the downwardly

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mobile economic rescaling of globalization is somehow a malfunction of personal character, thus mirroring the "negative identity hypothesis" of psychological terrorist profiles. Citing Arlie Hochschild on the "global masculinity crisis," this depiction of globalization is also proffered by Barbara Ehrenreich, who otherwise rightly suggests that the linkages among misogyny, masculinity, and terrorism need further probing.[63] But like Eisenstein's, Ehrenreich's assessment that gender-segregated spaces are the product of Islamic fundamentalist misogyny (veiling is usually cited as the most egregious example of oppression by liberal feminists) ignores decades (centuries even, per Fatima Mernissi's work) of Muslim feminist work arguing the contrary.[64] As Saba Mahmood argues, this myopia is due to the inability of secular liberal feminism to conceptualize the agency of religious women unless it appears as resistance to the nonsecular.[65] A final example of this feminist propensity should suffice: "Long-term warriors have a tendency to see women as a corrupting and debilitating force. Hence, perhaps, the all-male *madrassas* in Pakistan, where boys as young as six are trained for jihad, far from the potentially softening influence of mothers and sisters. Or recall terrorist Mohamed Atta's specification, in his will, that no woman handle his corpse or approach his grave."[66]

Interestingly, and this is a point not attended to by those attempting to ascribe something specific to the Muslim terrorist, the discourses of gender shaming and humiliation are endemic to conceptualizations (and self-presentations) of right-wing terrorists as well. The terrorism expert Jessica Stern's research spans a range of terrorist organizations, from Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh to Jewish, Christian, and white supremacist neo-Nazi:

> While the terrorists I met described a variety of grievances, almost every one talked about humiliation. The Identity Christian cultist told me he suffered from chronic bronchitis as a child and his mother discouraged him from exerting himself. He had been forced to attend the girls' physical education classes because he couldn't keep up with the boys. "I don't know if I ever got over the shame and humiliation of not being able to keep up with the other boys—or even with some of the girls," he said. The first time he felt strong was when he was living on an armed compound, surrounded by armed men.
>
> A man involved in the violent wing of the anti-abortion movement told me he was "vaginally defeated," but now he is "free," by which he meant celibate and beyond the influence of women.[67]

In these supposedly politically progressive efforts, many of them feminist, to de-pathologize the individual in favor of contextualizing socialization

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and the social, the victim status of the (always male) terrorist is resuscitated, this time not through the failures of the dysfunctional nuclear family but rather through the inescapable brutalities of global capital and heteronormativity. What is gained through these narrative devices? To summarize, through the consideration of gender and sexuality, these explanatory frames and models serve to (1) resurrect feminist constructions of "patriarchy," which homogenize and universalize heteronormative and nuclear familial and sexual relations, inferring that heterosexuality is the same everywhere; (2) posit the causal foci of terrorism within either the individual or within an undifferentiated social; in both cases, the nonsecular victim or defect model prevails, evacuating and nullifying political critiques and insurgent nonstate forms of resistance; (3) foreclose a serious evaluation of female terrorists by positing a failed masculinity and an investment in patriarchy as compulsory for the growth of terrorism; women are posited as either victims of patriarchy or as emasculating forces vis-à-vis globalization, and sometimes both concomitantly; (4) swerve from, if not avoid altogether, the conundrum of translating gender across geopolitical locations, in particular through the erasure of histories of gender-segregated space and a misreading of homosociability as engendered chiefly through the failure to secure "proper" heterosexuality, thus lending to the production of U.S. sexual exceptionalism; (5) preempt a serious, complicated dialogue about homosexuality in Arab societies that acknowledges the historical and spatial complexities of gender-segregated realms as well as the uneven processes of queer globalization, again rendering homonormativity as an exclusively western affair; and (6) conquer the unknown resistant possibilities of political dissent by resorting to the banality of nomenclature and of a narrative structure, thus obfuscating critical thinking through these containment strategies.

These stories about the consequences and punishments of nonnormative gender and kinship formations—that is, what these western feminists and scholars ensconced in liberal secularism understand as nonnormative—function to circumvent the transnational framings and translations of circuitry and reference points to favor a singular, national, and even cultural frame of appropriate subjecthood. In doing so, these feminist accounts unwittingly dovetail with those of the most conservative terrorist experts in the field, who similarly ascribe myopic, monocausal, psychological, and affective explanations to the phenomenon of terrorist violence, thus privatizing and evacuating the critiques of political economies that the terrorists themselves often articulate. But perhaps the most devastating insight

meticulously avoided by all explanations regardless of source or intent is of "the terrorist imagination that (without our knowing it) dwells within us all." In "The Mind of Terrorism," Jean Baudrillard writes:

> In the end, it was they who did it but we who wished it. If we do not take this fact into account, the event loses all symbolic dimension; it becomes a purely arbitrary act, the murderous phantasmagoria of a few fanatics we need only repress. But we know well that such is not the case. Without our profound complicity the event would not have reverberated so forcefully, and in their strategic symbolism the terrorists knew they could count on this unconfessable complicity.[68]

Thus it is not through the rhetoric of externality, of difference—cultural, economic, political, religious, psychological, or otherwise—that terrorism must be evaluated; what is needed is a theory of proximity that allows at once for both specificity and interiority, the interiority of familiarity and complicity.[69]

Homonational Spending

Another specific genealogy of homonationalism can be discerned in the long-standing debate about the relations between gay and lesbian civil liberties and queer consumer recognition. Janet Jakobsen argues that through the nation's reinvestment of "family values," the apparent contradiction between value-free markets and the restrictive, repressive policies of the nation-state can be manipulated to the nation's benefit. (How does the nation benefit? Jakobsen says precisely through the way the family is then reintegrated "at a different level into the transnational economy."):

> The market may not care if individuals are gay in the way lawmakers apparently do, but the appeal to market-niche status as site of gay liberation seriously underestimates the intertwining of the value-free with values and of the market and the state. Even apparent conflicts may enact the intertwining of the two. For example, if lesbian and gay politics just turns to the market over and against the dominative values of the state, such efforts will produce the most limited of "benefits." If family values are simply the site of stability over against flexible capital, then, we would read, for example, the Defense of Marriage Act as a contestation between market and the state, with the state articulating values and the market acting in a value-free manner. Fair enough. But what this reading does not include is the intertwining of the two, the ways these values also work for capitalism, the ways even when incorporated into the state as resistances to "diversity" and "transnationalization" in the economic sector, family values can

operate to remake the nation as family that can work in the "new world order." Constructing the family as nation allows the state to be relatively autonomous from the nation in such a way as to work for corporations, and since corporations don't really care whether "gays" who are not of the type eligible for employment can get married or not, the contradiction is not in any way disabling to the management of diversity in both the workforce and the nation. . . . Conflicts between the state and the market, thus, need to be understood as structured by complicity.[70]

We thus do not have an opposition here between civil liberties for queers and the offerings of the marketplace. That is to say, we are not stuck between the conservative claim that market entry is reflective of social equality and the assimilationist accusations from queer left factions. Rather, the nation benefits from the liberalization of the market, which proffers placebo rights to queer consumers who are hailed by capitalism but not by state legislation. Therefore, the familial- and kinship-delineating heteronormativity of the nation and the "value-free" homonationalism of the market are convivial and complicitous rather than oppositional entities. For this reason, my genealogy of homonationalism embraces both the emphasis of queer liberalism on the queer subject before the law and the coterminous and, in some cases, preceding presence of queer consumer citizenship offered by the market.

An example of how the nation benefits by homonationalism can be found in the history of the gay and lesbian tourism industry. As national identity is being reoriented toward excellence in consumption rather than public civic political participation, gay tourists are representative of a form of U.S. exceptionalism expressed through patriotic consumption designed to recover the American nation's psychic and economic health. Constituting more than 10 percent of the overall U.S. travel industry, the multibillion-dollar gay and lesbian tourist sector is characterized by consumers with high discretionary income, better education, and fewer children (and hence more leisure time) and who travel to more international locations than other tourists (compared to a national average of 29 percent, 89 percent of gay and lesbian tourists hold passports).[71] Thomas Roth, director of Community Marketing, states that while gay and lesbian travelers constitute about 10 percent of the market in terms of actual numbers, it is more than 10 percent of the market monetarily speaking. (As a gay and lesbian marketing firm, Community Marketing has to date generated the most statistical and demographic information about the gay and lesbian tourism industry.)

About this interest in international travel, Roth insists, "If there's one statistic that says something about gay and lesbian tourists, that's the one."[72] Their 2001 survey confirms the high discretionary income of gay and lesbian tourists due to the absence of children and attendant financial responsibilities, claiming that this group is about 50 percent dual income with no kids. The report goes on to state that, compared to the national average, gay and lesbian travelers travel more frequently and further, spend more money per trip, and have revitalized a flagging cruise industry (20 percent took a cruise, compared to the national average of 2 percent).[73] As might be expected, the industry (private companies as well as national, regional, and city tourist bureaus) centralizes the white middle- to upper-class gender-normative gay male traveler as its ideal tourist.[74] Emergent trends include "giving back to the community," the expansion of lesbian-oriented tourism, and the materialization of the gay and lesbian family travel market. While the original political impetus of the gay and lesbian travel industry was the disruption and dismantling of heterosexual space so that innovative visions of gay and lesbian spaces could emerge, a new social and political agenda has emerged in the push to "give back" in the form of charitable contributions and volunteer services to the nonprofit social, political, and health organizations that have supported gay and lesbian communities. The booming lesbian transnational adoption market has spurred the growth of both the lesbian tourism and the gay and lesbian family tourism market; the circuitry of these adoption networks are likewise cohered and impelled through the gay and lesbian tourism industry.

In *Selling Out: The Lesbian and Gay Movement Goes to Market*, Alexandra Chasin writes, "Advertising to gay men and lesbians has played on ideas about national identity in two significant ways. First, such advertising has often appealed to gays on the basis of their identification as Americans. Second, advertising to gay men and lesbians has often promised that full inclusion in the national community of Americans is available through personal consumption." Chasin's astute analysis of the role of U.S. nationalism in the creation and maintenance of the gay and lesbian marketing demographic is especially relevant to current homonormative imaginative geographies. Noting that in the early decades of the twentieth century advertising in the United States was one vehicle for uniting white immigrant submarkets into a "single—and American, or at least Americanizable —mass," Chasin demonstrates that this historical precedent sets up the promise of American belonging through consumption for nonwhite ethnic immigrants and later, in the early 1990s, for gays and lesbians. Moreover,

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she argues that, since the 1970s, the increasing pressure to create "new classes of consumers" led to the demand for the "national" and the "niche" to coexist: "So at the same time that producers have needed national markets, they have also needed specialized markets, and it is in this context that 'diversity' has become both a social value (however superficially) and an economic imperative."[75] This history of Americanization through consumption practices, clearly tied to the rise of discourses of multiculturalism and diversity, foreshadows the mandate to mark forms of U.S. nationalism and patriotism in the context of the war on terror, a mandate that the gay and lesbian tourism industry fully embraced.

Terrorism has long been articulated as the foe of tourism, the former breeding intolerance and hatred, while the latter is constituted as a democratizing and liberalizing venture that embraces pluralism.[76] Immediately after the attacks, Robert Wilson, executive director of the International Gay and Lesbian Travel Association (IGLTA) wrote, "IGLTA headquarters has been rather quiet of late due to the current situation that's developed from the tragedy of September 11th. Members from as far away as Turkey and New Zealand are reporting a rather sharp decline in inquires and new business, with other members advising that they have received many cancellations." This assessment was quickly revised a month later; these cautionary missives were rapidly replaced by narratives of recovery that contrasted sharply with the overall assessments of the tourism industry at the time: "Two G & L travel surveys have recently been published and these too are reflecting real increases and that our community is in the forefront of 'business as usual' with travel plans and holiday reservations being maintained and the commitment to not allow the present climate to disrupt business travel or vacations." Already distinct from the broader tourism industry, claiming the greater affluence and greater mobility of its constituency as well as a political disruption of heteronormative travel practices and spaces, the gay and lesbian tourism industry niche market immediately began staging its defense against the general slowdown of travel after 9/11.[77] Two examples follow:

> What a rough time. Your friends at Community Marketing know that you/we are all hurting on many levels: emotional, spiritual and financial. Our best "therapy" is to move ahead, and not let these *outside interests* paralyze us for too long. I flew on an AA flight Thursday 9/20, and it was good to see more activity, more security, more confidence. (Community Marketing newsletter, October 2001, emphasis mine)

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For most of us, travel = freedom and we value that right. (Community Marketing e-mail, October 2001)

In positing the events of September 11 as "outside interests," the gay and lesbian tourism industry sought to recuperate itself as distinct and exceptional. Therapeutic healing through consumption is proffered by further distancing itself from the broader tourism industry, as well as through a disavowal of any connection to the political ramifications of the attacks.[78] Encouragement of patriotic consumption allows participation in the national grieving psyche and allows for queer subjects to embrace as well as be embraced by the nation. Furthermore, the equation "travel = freedom" references both the notion that travel can function as an escape from heteronormativity and the promotion of U.S. exceptionalism regarding freedom and democracy. Claiming greater opportunities for travel for gay and lesbian consumers, advertising missives stated that unlike the "general public," gay and lesbian travelers planned to take no fewer vacations in the next twelve months as a result of the terrorist attacks. They also correctly predicted a record turnout for the annual International Gay and Lesbian World Travel Expo held in New York City in October 2001. In an e-mail circulated days after the attacks, Community Marketing stated, "While the mainstream travel industry is stagnating and trying to find a direction, research shows that gay and lesbian travelers plan no decrease in future vacations." According to an online survey of 446 gay and lesbian travelers conducted at the end of September 2001, 65 percent planned to take at least three vacations in the coming twelve months, nearly unchanged from the previous twelve months. Nine percent of domestic vacations and 10 percent of international vacations had been postponed as a result of the attacks and the economic downturn, but it was claimed that few gay and lesbian tourists had canceled their travel plans. Furthermore, the report revealed that among the motivations for choosing destinations, 50 percent cited "gay-friendly" locations, 42 percent "more affordable," and 29 percent "safer."

Similarly, in an editorial for *Passport Magazine* written in response to her research on the impact of the September 11 attacks on the gay and lesbian tourism industry, Reed Ide declared, "Gays and lesbians, in greater numbers than the population at large, will not be driven easily from the values and pleasures they hold dear."[79] Echoing this sentiment, Celso A. Thompson, president of IGLTA, stated in their November 2001 newsletter, "The terrorist attacks on 9-11 continue to have a devastating impact in the travel industry. Travel agents are losing 50 million dollars per day worldwide.

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Economists predict a decrease of 1.8% in the American economy and no recovery until the fourth quarter of 2002. . . . The good news is that gay and lesbian travel is still a leading niche in the travel industry. Tour operators and specialized travel agents experience a different reality to the industry norm. The booking pace seems to be recovering."[80]

Notably, lesbian tourism overall was not a beneficiary of these statistical claims. Many lesbian tour operators reported significant booking losses in the wake of September 11 and the following months, reflecting divergent gendered relationships to mobility, space, place, and nation rarely commented on by industry frontrunners. Given the general lack of debate on race and racial diversity within the gay and lesbian travel industry, it is feasible to claim that the industry constructs itself as outside the effects of racial profiling and travel surveillance technologies. Therefore, these discourses of patriotic resilience work in tandem with an overt effacement of the racialized and gendered aspects of the gay and lesbian tourism industry (and the fact that many queers live with the threat of violence in the United States daily). Further, it is important to iterate, as M. V. Lee Badgett does, that such statistical profiles, also produced by the Simmons Marketing Research Bureau and Overlooked Opinions, not only misrepresent gays and lesbians as affluent, progeny-free consumers,[81] but historically they have also been used as ammunition for state and county antigay ballot initiative campaigns, often in rural locales (in Colorado, Oregon, Idaho, Maine, and Florida). Since the early 1990s "economic misinformation" has been used by the right wing to argue against "special rights" for gays and lesbians.[82] The rhetoric of touristic exceptionalism is thus reliant on an urban-rural dichotomy as well as demographics that then serve to further marginalize those the industry leaders would otherwise characterize as part of their community. Ironically, rural constituencies are a prime source of potential tourists wanting to travel to urban gay meccas.

What fuels this rhetoric of queer touristic exceptionalism? And what are the relationships between this exceptionalism and U.S. nationalism and patriotism? Chasin points to the compatibility of U.S. nationalism with a "kind of gay nationalism" through a shared discourse of "by our people and for our people," suggesting a "friendly and close, if not identical, relation between the gay community and U.S. national foundations . . . enact[ing] the convergence of market and state, reinforcing the equation between citizens and consumers."[83] In the case of gay and lesbian tourists, the purported demonstration of a commitment to mobility and travel signals far more than merely a set of consumption practices. It also highlights a com-

mitment to U.S. nationalism and patriotism, responding to pleas to revive the psychic and economic health of the U.S. nation devastated by the terrorist attacks, and suggests a convergence of consumption and politics: you are what you buy, politically speaking. If you are not a terrorist, you are a patriot, as demonstrated by an excellence in consumption, and the act of consumption is a statement about one's political belief in the democratic machinery of the United States. Thus the exceptionalism presented in these narratives about gay and lesbian consumption contains not only the gay or lesbian consumer as a consumer par excellence, but also marks this homonational consumer as an American patriot par excellence. Homonationalism is sustained not only via privileged relations to capital, but also through replicating discourses of nationalism and its attendant fantasies of racial harmony and gender normativity. The homonational is mobilized against the immobile terrorist look-alike. Furthermore, the transnational circuits of capital entail that homonationalism circulates both through nationalism and beyond it. U.S. exceptionalisms may well be articulated by homonationalism globally, and homonationalism is increasingly immanent to some strands of U.S. exceptionalism, especially in the realms of consumption and human and sexual rights discourses.

South Park *and the Pakistani Leather Bottom*

I turn now to *South Park*, cable channel Comedy Central's popular cartoon show directed at adults and known for its dark celebration of perversity and excess.[84] Always ridiculing the contradictions of politically correct liberalism, the show's satirical storylines regularly produce social and political commentaries about contemporary race, gender, and class politics with a focus on that which is uncomfortable, uncanny, or shunned. While its audience is clearly international, as demonstrated by the variety of fans conversing about the show in chat rooms and on listservs, *South Park* is very much about the mockery of so-called American mores and values. However, I am interested in *South Park* not because of the size or location of its audience, nor because of its potential or perceived cultural impact. Rather, what intrigues me is the reflection of and continuities with critiques of the war on terror and the pathologization of terrorist bodies that is surfacing in popular culture. Thus *South Park* itself, as perhaps a minor cultural artifact, may appear superfluous, but the implications of its representational praxis and approaches are not. The trivial must be attended to precisely because marking it as such may mask or obfuscate its deeper cultural relevance.

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South Park immediately took on the imbrications of nonnormative sexualities and perverse and pathological nationalities in the post-9/11 context. First aired on November 7, 2001, episode 509, "Osama bin Laden Has Farty Pants" had originally been titled "Osama bin Laden Has a Small Penis"—a title much more to the point. A frenzied plot finds three friends, Cartman (the pudgy boy), Stan (the average American kid), and Kyle (the brainy Jew), held in captivity in bin Laden's cave in Afghanistan. In one scene Cartman inexplicably pulls bin Laden's pants down (presumably to thwart him?), only to reveal one magnifying glass after another, for a total of nine, until finally his small penis is discernable. A sign appears, "Tiny, ain't it?," and Cartman asks, "So *that's* what this is all about?" Pointing to the popular obsessions with the sexuality of criminality, especially in the tabloid press, Cartman's observation, as reductive as it may be, mimics, mirrors, and isn't so far off from radical feminist interpretations of contemporary conflict, for example, Robin Morgan's conceptualization of "ejaculatory politics." A more astute reading of the fascination with bin Laden's small package is offered by Mark Driscoll, who opines, "Although there are other possible readings, I want to argue that the identification of lack with Osama bin Laden is isomorphic with the inscription of modernization shortcomings in capitalist developmental discourse. That is, the coercion of one single model of development and sociohistorical progress onto the semi-periphery and periphery of the world system consolidated a structure where lack was naturalized for places outside the North."[85] The lack in penis size signals the lack of modernity; thus the space of the traditional is feeble, flaccid, weak. Later in the episode, Cartman once again tries to distract bin Laden, this time by masquerading as a Muslim woman in a purple chador sitting on a camel. In the display of bin Laden's dysfunctional heterosexuality—his eyes bugging out, falling on the floor, tongue lolling on the ground, howling like a wild animal—it turns out that he is more interested in fornicating with the camel, whom he then proceeds to woo with wine. Now the lack of modernity (a perverse modernity) this time figured by the veiled Muslim woman (whose lack, unlike bin Laden's, cannot even be seen, but is hidden by the veil), is coupled with Orientalist imageries of animalistic excess and bestiality.

More recently, *South Park* continues to press against the parameters of national homosexualities, fragmenting sexual spaces to such an extent that even queerness, as a critique of identity, cannot account for the multiplicity of contradictions. In the October 2003, much-chattered about "South Park Is Gay" episode, the school kids of South Park have jumped on the metro-

sexual fad with a vengeance. Sporting freshly highlighted hair and trendy new clothing and dishing in the latest lingo about fabrics, fashion, and hygiene, Stan, Cartman, and Kenny deride Kyle for wearing his regular polyester jacket. "You gotta get with the times, girlfriend," claims Stan. Adds Cartman, "Yeah, that jacket is so September 10th."

In this U.S.-based context, metrosexuality, a modality seeped in metro and urban referents (though in *South Park* the setting is not urban) that tentatively queers (and to some extent, effeminizes and emasculates) straight men, is a symptom of the pervasiveness of homonationalism, in that queerness has already been assimilated into the homonational. As a marker of that which is passé, tedious, and tired, September 10 delineates an age of old-fashioned American innocence and ignorance (an advertising line nostalgically capitalized on by many, for example, Kenneth Cole, whose clothing ad uses September 12 as a moment of lingering normalcy: "On September 12th, we used protection in the bedroom, not in the mailroom"). Outdated as well are normative hetero-homo divides. As a "contact" that operates as a "conductor" (Foucault), metrosexuality both caves in to this binary and implodes it. Metrosexuality entails contact with queerness and conducts the appropriation of stereotypically queer attributes by heterosexual men. As a response to the age of terrorism, and the war on terror, metrosexuality in its American incarnation stages its own form of terrorism, manifested through penetrating and all-encompassing queer aesthetics, even as it capitulates to the regime of homonationalism though the dilution of queer politics: queerness is now something spectacular to be had, to covet, rather than to reject and revile. In this imaginative geography, the dovetailing of two claims of U.S. exceptionalism—of superior counterterrorism intelligence and technology and of the greatest sexual freedom and tolerance—come together in the demarcation of September 10 as part of a prior era. In taking a jab at the glib and facile use of September 11 as a significant moment of change in global history, the scene both displaces this usage—how often is reference made to September 10?—but also, through its allusion to an article of clothing, made of polyester no less, the iconic and even traumatic standing of September 11 is mocked. As a counterpart to the age of U.S. new imperialism, metrosexuality triumphantly hails American modernity as the space of sexual exceptionalism and promotes a union between queerness and patriotism, albeit one that most profitably hails from cosmopolitan cityscapes. Thus, this imaginative geography of the United States, privileging a cosmopolitan, urban (*metro*) formation of sexual laissez fair, smoothes the cracks and fissures of a highly

uneven national terrain of sexual and racial differences across spaces, foregrounding at once the presumed centrality of urban spaces to queer cultures (an urban-rural dichotomy that elides other forms of dissident sexualities that emerge elsewhere) and the desire to repress a metropole-periphery model in favor of a unified singular impression of American tolerance. As a nascent homonational thread, the *metro* of metrosexuality suggests that these threads are most readily apparent in cosmopolitan cityscapes. Critiquing the unmarked privileging of urban spaces to queer theorizing, Judith Halberstam defines "metronormativity" as a tendency that problematically "reveals the rural to be the devalued term in the urban/rural binary governing the spatialization of modern U.S. sexual identities."[86] Read through this particular exchange in *South Park*, we can signal urban spaces as rife with virulent homonationalist fodder while at the same time acknowledging that rural places and spaces, despite their general characterization as intolerant of queer cultures, should not be underestimated as they might provide greater or different opportunities for parallel or contrasting homonational formations. Further, propping up urban scapes as optimal for the proliferation of homonationalisms both effaces the varied topography of cities (in New York City, for example, the difference between Chelsea and Jackson Heights) and functions as a displacement of urban queer bashing in favor of fetishistic renderings of violences encountered in small towns and rural areas.[87]

The rest of the episode features the "Fab Five" from *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy*, a television show that solidified the metrosexual phenomenon in the United States, radiating out from its European (predominantly British) roots. The boys' fathers define metrosexuality in various interlocking ways. Skeeter, refuting the charge that he has turned gay, claims, "Just because a guy cares about how he looks and is in touch with his feminine side doesn't mean he's gay anymore." Stuart chimes in, "Yeah. Metrosexual means you're straight, but you appreciate the gay culture." "It's superfabulous," adds Randy. As the Fab Five metrosexualize everything in their wake and plans are made for a metrosexual pride parade to combat metrophobia, the gay schoolteacher Mr. Garrison, fed up with the selling out of gay culture and identity, calls the metrosexual fad to a halt.

For the most part, these and other examples are surface treatments of sexual politics that pale in comparison to one episode in particular.[88] In the midst of a U.S. military buildup to an imminent invasion of Iraq and massive global antiwar protests, an especially bizarre *South Park* episode titled "The Death Camp of Tolerance" first aired on November 20, 2003. Dis-

covering that he could sue his employers for millions of dollars if fired from his position because of his sexual orientation, Mr. Garrison uses sexual performativity to escalate discomfort and elicit disgust from his fourth-grade students. One day in class Mr. Garrison introduces a new teacher's assistant, Mr. Slave (who appears white), otherwise called the "Teacher's Ass." Mr. Slave, typifying a leather bottom, is a large strapping white man with a dark moustache, clad in a pink shirt, blue jeans, black leather chaps, vest, and boots, and a police cap. As a leather bottom, Mr. Slave is not only a gay or queer character, as represented by Mr. Garrison, but also a figure of sexual transgression and perversity referencing S/M sexual practices, the sexual promiscuity of gay male culture, and its attendant pathologized recreational drug usage. After his introduction Mr. Slave moves toward his seat, but not before being spanked by Mr. Garrison. As Mr. Slave sits down, Cartman and Craig, two white students in the classroom, confer about Mr. Slave. Cartman, whispering to Craig while glancing around furtively, states, "Dude, I think that Mr. Slave guy might be a . . . Pakistani."

This significant moment is swift and quickly overridden by a return to the classroom antics of Mr. Garrison and his slave. The comment reflects a curious suturing of racial and sexual difference: the perverse leather bottom, unrecognized as such by the students, is instead mistaken for another historically salient figure of perversion, the Muslim other of Orientalist fame. This other is of course perversely sexualized as well: the Pakistani is recognized through, not against, his sexual excesses, as well as through Mr. Slave's feminized gender positioning as the recipient of a spanking, and later, of being anally penetrated by a gerbil. If one juxtaposes the queer (leather, S/M) body with the Pakistani (Muslim, fundamentalist, terrorist) body, the commonality of perversion becomes clearer, in that both bodies represent pathological spaces of violence that are constituted as sexually excessive, irrational, and abnormal, taking us back to the figure of the terrorist in Orientalist, public policy, and feminist archives.

One can open up this analysis to the level of geopolitics as well. It is notable that Cartman did not wonder if Mr. Slave was an Afghani or an Iraqi. By naming him a Pakistani, the show astutely points to an understated complexity in the war on terror, that of the liminal position of the nation of Pakistan. Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan's conundrum has been about the question of its own state-sanctioned and unsanctioned terrorism: caught between U.S. expectations of assistance in reining in terrorist cells (this assistance rewarded by the lifting of trade sanctions and greater access to IMF loans) and India's wrath as a supposed victim of

Pakistan's terrorist activities. One could read the referencing of Pakistan as the hailing of the unaddressed terrorist (in that sense, it is a covert acknowledgment of the status of Saudi Arabia as well). More pointedly, the scene alludes to the complicity of the United States and the CIA with the buildup of Pakistan's terrorist industrial complex: military dictators, opium markets, terrorist training centers set up to fight the Soviets. Arundhati Roy writes of post-9/11 relations between the United States and Pakistan, "Now the U.S. government is asking (asking?) Pakistan to garrote the pet it [the United States] has hand-reared in its backyard for so many years."[89] Pakistan, in Roy's estimation, has been the pilfered bottom to the United States' imperialist topping.

The anally penetrated Mr. Slave tempts the viewer into another association: that of the suicide bomber. In his seminal article "Is the Rectum a Grave?," Leo Bersani complicates the feminized posture of those receiving anal sex. In its close association with AIDS, Bersani argues, anal sex has come to figure, for heterosexuals, as a destructive self-annihilation, a dark side ascribed to the *jouissance* of ecstatically forsaken bodily boundaries during sexual exchange.[90] Judith Butler, summarizing Jeff Nunokawa, writes that the male homosexual is "always already dying, as one whose desire is a kind of incipient and protracted dying." This kind of sex not only kills oneself, but also, through the demolition of the self, kills others. Butler further elaborates the multiplicity of death: "The male homosexual is figured time and time again as one whose desire is somehow structured by death, either as the desire to die, or as one whose desire is inherently punishable by death."[91] Likewise, the suicide bomber, always already dying, is not only consumed with perverted desires of the deaths of self and others, but also focused on the exact target of technologies of death. This incorporation of death, as Fanon argues, saturates every stratum of being: "The terrorist, from the moment he undertakes an assignment, allows death to enter his soul."[92] The ghost of the suicide bomber haunts Mr. Slave, interpellated here as the sexually deviant Pakistani.

Thus, the effeminate and emasculated status of Pakistan, as symbolized through the anally penetrated Mr. Slave, is signified as a nation that is decomposing and deteriorating. Cast into the politics of the South Asian diaspora, Pakistan, through an erasure of the huge number of Muslims in India, represents the Muslim other, an association from which normative Hindu Americans and Sikh Americans must distance themselves. This distancing requires an ever-narrowing South Asian model minority positioning as it seeks to separate from terrorist look-alikes. But most important,

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Pakistan is used, in the dual movement of disciplining and quarantining, to separate the nationally sanctioned space of U.S. queerness, the homonormative Mr. Garrison, from the banished, perverse, external Muslim other.

Back to *South Park*, where the students complain to their parents that Mr. Garrison and his assistant are "totally gay" and "super gay." The parents chastise them and immediately take them to the Museum of Tolerance. Inside the Hall of Stereotypes, the group walks through the Tunnel of Prejudice, where they hear "queer, beaner, chink, nigger, heeb, faggot, cracker, slope, jap." "Queer" and "faggot" are the only nonracial and non-ethnic epithets, analogizing race with sexuality and once again producing the white queer as split off from the perverse racial other. After surveying and challenging a number of stereotypes, they come across the Arab as terrorist. The tour guide promptly says, "But of course, we know that all Arabs aren't terrorists, don't we kids?" (Note an interesting slippage: in the official transcript of the show, the text reads otherwise: "But of course, we know that all Arabs are terrorists, don't we kids?")

The next day in class, Mr. Garrison proceeds to insert the class gerbil, Lemmiwinks, into Mr. Slave's anus, after the paddling and gagging of the hospitable leather bottom results in no disciplinary action whatsoever from the school's administration. Lemmiwinks disappears into Mr. Slave's anus; after encountering a skeleton of another gerbil in Mr. Slave's lower intestine, Lemmiwinks turns around, only to find that Mr. Slave's anus is now closed. In a bizarre subplot that tempts even the critical bounds of *South Park*, Lemmiwinks embarks on a journey to traverse Mr. Slave's large intestine in hopes of finding another opening. A folk song dictates his voyage: "Lemmiwinks! Lemmiwinks! You must escape the gay man's ass or your tale can not be told." Encouraged by the spirits of the Frog King, the Sparrow Prince, and the Catfish—the remains of other small animals shoved into Mr. Slave's anus (called the "ass of doom")—Lemmiwinks and the three spirits are eventually coughed up by Mr. Slave, and Lemmiwinks is crowned the Gerbil King. In the meantime, Mr. Garrison's failed efforts to get fired land him and Mr. Slave in Tolerance Camp, where they've been sent by the school principal to learn to tolerate their own behavior.

As a team, Mr. Garrison and Mr. Slave embody the sliding relationship between the pyramid structural model and the network model. Mr. Garrison speaks to the civilizational projects at hand: as both the object of tolerance and the tolerant subject, he disciplines the monstrosity of Mr. Slave even as he manipulates this monstrosity. Mr. Slave is a convenient conduit or foil for Mr. Garrison's own reticent perverse proclivities. We see

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also that such binary characterizations are part of the history of sexuality as written by the west. Let us take a look at Foucault's performative and pedagogical rendering of the Orient, which, as Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson argue, "was not a geographical concept; rather, it included the Greco-Roman world, as well as the modern Middle East and North Africa,"[93] in the form of the *ars erotica* that he ascribes to "the societies" of China, Japan, India, Rome, and the Arabo-Moslem:

> In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. Moreover, this knowledge must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though from within and amplify its effects. In this way, there is formed a knowledge that must remain secret, not because of an element of infamy that might attach to its object, but because of the need to hold it in the greatest reserve, since, according to tradition, it would lose its effectiveness and its virtue by being divulged. Consequently, the relationship to the master who holds the secret is of paramount importance; only he, working alone, can transmit this art in an esoteric manner and as the culmination of an initiation in which he guides the disciple's progress with unfailing skill and severity. The effects of this masterful art, which are considerably more generous than the spareness of its prescriptions would lead one to imagine, are said to transfigure the one fortunate enough to receive its privileges: an absolute mastery of the body, a singular bliss, obliviousness to time and limits, the elixir of life, the exile of death and its threats.[94]

As distinct from *scientia sexualis*, *ars erotica* signals the perverse modernity (but is it modern?) outside of science, outside of the domestication of sex through the confessional and through the clinical practices of psychoanalysis. Mr. Garrison, through the disclosure of his affinities in his confessional classroom performances, occupies the realm of *scientia sexualis* as representative of that which can be told. Within Foucault's "act to identity" telos, one that suggests an incomplete continuum with multiple slippages and ruptures but nonetheless posits temporal progression, the *ars erotica*, embodied here by Mr. Slave, functions as a prediscursive space of sexual acts and the return of surges of unrestricted and unregulated desire (one which Foucault contests via a critique of psychoanalysis). In short, as an "art of

initiation and the masterful secret," *ars erotica* is not simply outside of, but is opposed to, the knowledge-power configuration of the telling of sex in the Christian west.[95]

Thus, the perverse and the primitive collide in the figure of Mr. Slave: the violence of homophobia is shown to be appropriate when directed toward a pathological nationality, while the violence of racism is always already caught in the naming of the queer. The show works to demonstrate the unevenness of liberal forms of diversity and tolerance, noting, as Edward Said does in *Orientalism*, that the Arab terrorist is a stereotypical category which nonetheless exceeds the normative boundaries of deconstructing the Other. In reading the *ars erotica* through the lens of Said's *Orientalism*, one deeply attentive to the imaginative geographies of the Orient and the Occident yet myopically resistant to the omnipresent homoerotics of colonialism, we see perversion and primitivity coalesce in the figure of the queer terrorist: guided from above, subsumed to the will of a master, death-seeking and death-defying, unable to comprehend rational structures of temporality and space, drunk with pleasure. Sexuality in *ars erotica* is both prediscursive and beyond discourse, what Afary and Anderson describe as Foucault's "Romantic Orientalism" and "what he regarded as the open homoeroticism of the Arab Mediterranean."[96] The Orient, as interpreted from the Occident, is the space of illicit sexuality, unbridled excess, and generalized perversion, "dangerous sex and freedom of intercourse," and afflicted with nonnormative corporeal practices.[97] Mr. Slave exemplifies what Foucault names "pursued pleasures"—bodies, practices, and energies both "sought after and searched out"—fascinating pleasures simultaneously abhorred and coveted. Said writes that "the Orient was a place where one could look for sexual experiences unobtainable in Europe" and procure "a different type of sexuality." As a regenerative discourse—"the Orient is a form of release, a place of original opportunity"—prolific reproduction of the sexual norms of the Occident is made possible through the sexual excesses of the Orient, available through the travel and conquest of colonialism. Seen as the space of spirituality and sensuality, the Orient helps the Occident to maintain the rigidity of the rational while partaking in the secret pleasures of the illicit. As with other processes of colonial extraction and production, the raw materials of the Orient—in this case, the "raw novelty" of sexual perversion—are imported to sustain the prolific consumption habits, fertility, and reproduction of the Occident.[98] Foucault also points to the Orient as regenerative, stating that the *scientia sexualis* may

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actually be the *ars erotica* par excellence. In this statement the premodern and the postmodern converge. Mr. Garrison extracts a differential value from Mr. Slave to reorganize his status within his place of employment; as both in opposition to (dichotomy) and an extension of (continuum), Mr. Garrison and Mr. Slave work through complementarity as well as (Derridean) supplementarity. Mr. Slave personifies the raw materials extracted and imported for Mr. Garrison's regenerating usage and ultimate gain. As the queer terrorist, Mr. Slave functions to regenerate the U.S.-based homonormativity of Mr. Garrison; the whiteness of gay, homosexual, and even queer is normativized through this pairing.

The ritualized acts of sex performed by Mr. Garrison and Mr. Slave also demarcate a queer temporality of sorts: the incommensurability of the perceived queer Pakistani terrorist and the white gay schoolteacher is at once the management of the crisis of modernity—the traditional and the modern woven together—and a reaching beyond the typical prescriptions of the past informing the present and the present reverberating back to the past, undermining the temporality of fear that aims to secure the present-future through the future, to a certain kind of futurity, the queer times of now and beyond. Mr. Slave embodies a harking back in time that projects both the future that must be conquered and the future that cannot be overcome—the future and the antifuture. The singularity of each figure lies not only in what they represent—tradition/modernity, white/brown, patriot/terrorist, assimilated/monstrous—but in what they perform, in the temporalities they issue forth. As Mbembe argues, "What connects terror, death, and freedom is an ecstatic notion of temporality and politics. The future, here, can be authentically anticipated, but not in the present. The present itself is but a moment of vision—vision of the freedom not yet come."[99]

Terror/Sex

How does the queer terrorist function to regenerate the heteronormative or even homonormative patriot, elaborated in the absurd but tangible play between the terrorist and the patriot? In the never-ending displacement of the excesses of perverse sexualities to the outside, a mythical and politically and historically overstated externality so fundamental to the imaginative geographies at stake, the (queer) terrorist regenerates the civilizational missives central to the reproduction of racist-heterosexist U.S. and homonormative nationalisms, apparent in public policy archives, feminist discourses, and media representations, among other realms. Discourses of

terrorism are thus intrinsic to the management not only of race, as is painfully evident through the entrenching modes of racial profiling and hate crime incidents. Just as significantly, and less often acknowledged, discourses of terrorism are crucial to the modulation and surveillance of sexuality, indeed a range of sexualities, within and outside U.S. parameters. Unfortunately (or fortunately—this story has not been fully written yet), U.S. nationalisms no longer a priori exclude the homosexual; it is plausible perhaps, given the generative and constitutive role that homosexuality plays in relation to heteronormativity as well as homosociality, that the heteronormativity so necessary to nationalist discourse has been a bit overstated or has functioned to overshadow the role of homosexual and homonormative others in the reproduction of nation.

I have elaborated upon three threads of homonationalism: feminist scholarly analysis that, despite its progressive political intent, reproduces the gender-sex nonnormativity of Muslim sexuality; gay and lesbian tourists who perform U.S. exceptionalisms, reanimated via 9/11, embedded in the history of LGBTIQ consumer-citizens; and the inclusion of gay and queer subjectivities that are encouraged in liberal discourses of multiculturalism and diversity but are produced through racial and national difference. As reflected by the debates on gay marriage in the United States, these are highly contingent forms of nationalism and arguably accrue their greatest purchase through transnational comparative frames rather than debates within domestic realms; sustaining these contradictions is perhaps the most crucial work of imaginative geographies of nationalism. Produced in tandem with the "state of exception,"[100] the demand for patriotic loyalty to the United States merely accelerates forms of sexual exceptionalism that have always underpinned homonormativities. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently or intrinsically antination or antinationalist about queerness, despite a critical distancing from gay and lesbian identities. Through the disaggregating registers of race, kinship, and consumption, among others, queerness is also under duress to naturalize itself in relation to citizenship, patriotism, and nationalism. While many claim September 11 and the war on terror as scotomatous phenomena, the demand for patriotic loyalty merely accelerates forms of queer exceptionalism that have always underpinned the homonational. In a climate where President Bush states that gay marriage would annihilate "the most fundamental institution of civilization" and the push for a constitutional amendment to defend heterosexual marriage is called "the ultimate homeland security" (equating gay marriage with terrorism, by former Pennsylvania Republican senator Rick San-

torum), homonationalism is also a temporal and spatial illusion, a facile construction that is easily revoked, dooming the exceptional queers to insistent replays and restagings of their exceptionalisms.[101]

Thus the "gains" achieved for queers, gains that image the United States in sexually exceptional terms, media, kinship (gay marriage), legality (sodomy), consumption (queer tourism) and so forth, can be read in the context of the war on terror, the USA PATRIOT Act, the Welfare Reform Act, and unimpeded U.S. imperialist expansion, as conservative victories at best, if at all. It is not only that a history of race is produced through sexuality that renders white heterosexuality proper in contrast to (black, slave) colored heterosexuality as improper, and as always in the teleological progressive space of mimicry. The history of Euro-American gay and lesbian studies and queer theory has produced a cleaving of queerness, always white, from race, always heterosexual and always homophobic. But now we have the split between proper, national (white) homosexuality (. . . queerness?) and improper (colored) nonnational queerness. Therefore, the proliferating sexualities of which Foucault speaks (the good patriot, the bad terrorist, the suicide bomber, the married gay boy, the monster-terrorist-fag, the effeminate turbaned man, the Cantor Fitzgerald wives, the white firefighters, the tortured Iraqi detainee . . .) must be studied not as analogous, dichotomous, or external to each other, but in their singularities, their relatedness, their lines of flight, their internalities to and their complicities with one another.